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Abstract. Statements for public health purposes such as “1 in 2 will get cancer by 
age 85” have appeared in public spaces.  The meaning drawn from such statements 
affects economic welfare, not just public health. Both markets and government use 
risk information on all kinds of risks; useful information can, in turn, improve 
economic welfare, however inaccuracy can lower it. We adapt the contingency table 
approach so that a quoted risk is cross-classified with the states of nature. We show 
that bureaucratic objective functions regarding the accuracy of a reported cancer risk 
can then be stated.  
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Introduction 
Public health messages quoting the risk of cancer are commonly issued. For example, in 
Australia, “By the age of 85, the risk is estimated to increase to 1 in 2 for males and 1 in 
3 for females” [1]. Cancer risk messages are also stated on cancer websites 
internationally.  
The concept of cumulative risk underlies these “1 in 2” and “1 in 3” types of 
messages (regarding Australia) and assumes cancer is the only cause of death [2–5]. 
Since the reported risk of cancer in Australia has encompassed this implicit assumption, 
an over-statement of the risk is given by this message. Australia is not the only country 
overlooking this assumption in messages to the public about the quoted risk of cancer. 
Cancer risk information protects public health. As well, risk of cancer messages 
affect resource allocation overall, and thus economic welfare. Some of the economic 
implications of risk messages are being overlooked in general, and the quality of the 
cancer risk information being quoted and reported also affects resource allocation. 
Herein an a priori reasoning exercise clarifies the approach to improving the quality of 
the risk information being quoted and reported on cancer. It should be noted that the 
focus here is on the objective content, or accuracy, of cancer risk messages provided to 
the public: personal responses to cancer risk messages, such as positive and negative 
motivations, fear, anxiety, fatalism etc, are a separate topic. 
   
 
 
An historic illustration is useful to show the implication for economic welfare of a 
policy stance towards a health risk. The example is the epidemiological evidence about 
the risk level of the obstetric X-ray. The relevant evidence which was discovered by 
Alice Stewart in the 1950s involving a theoretical error at that time that had developed 
amongst scientists who were misconceiving threshold levels. Contrary to theory current 
at that time, the tipping point for obstetric X-ray is not a value greater than zero: the 
tipping point value is zero. The effect overall on economic welfare of miscalculating the 
public health risk of obstetric X-rays was not trivial. Foremost, the incidence of 
childhood leukaemia heightened. Implicitly there existed a severe under-allocation of 
resources to the public message about the risk of exposing pregnant women to X-rays. 
Zero resources were spent on that message whilst far too many resources were directed 
to obstetric X-ray.  
This historic illustration about a risk estimate that was objectively incorrect in the 
case of obstetric X-rays tells of incorrect information on the false negative rate, and 
affected the message taken from the risk signal issued: that incorrect information was 
not apparent. The rate was rising, and unnoticed; and, in turn, scarce pregnancy resources 
were increasingly misallocated through time. Incidentally, the appropriate public 
message for the (then) practice of obstetric X-ray, viz. that practice ought to be 
abandoned, formed only after three decades [6]. 
On economic grounds, the judicious management of cancer resources encompasses 
the notion of useful public knowledge about the risk of cancer. This idea is a new notion 
in current times. The relevant economic literature on health is also not new. Regarding 
the former, daily life in many countries proceeds on a base of useful literacy about 
everyday risks. This literacy exists because risk information has economic value to 
populations. There are many examples of informing the public of risks, such as: 
macroeconomic uncertainty; meteorological risk (e.g. cyclones and tornadoes) and 
planetary climate; natural hazards such as bushfires and seismic disturbance; financial 
safety and consumer protection policy; and all the umbrellas for public safety such as 
public health, workplace safety and road safety. The economic decision-making over 
health involves many types of risks, and the economic decisions that arise from those 
risks, such as participating in cancer screening services, or not doing so; fitness, or not; 
exercising; nutritious food, or not; smoking, or not; excessive consumption of alcohol, 
or not; being SunSmart, or not.  The decisions over all such dichotomies involve 
opportunity costs; and there is a spectrum of stances in between the dichotomies: there 
is an opportunity cost with every decision. Stark errors and unrealistic assumptions in 
the risk of cancer messages to the public not only affect the health status at the population 
level but overall resource allocation, with flow-on effects for population mortality and 
life expectancy.  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the economic literature on health the 
relevant theoretical development is no novelty in health economics. Those developments 
hearken to Grossman, Becker, Muth, and Pollak and Wachter [7–10]. The theoretical 
contributions about the link between information and economic efficiency began with 
Arrow, and Greenwald and Stiglitz [11–12]. Space limitations constrain discussion either 
of these developments or of the empirical studies that followed. We also place aside other 
conceptual developments about risk in the literature, including risk aversion and 
expected utility, as well as the developments reported in the psychology literatures about 
the limitations on human rationality as well as on processing the meaning of risk 
messages. 
 
   
 
 
1. The economic dimensions of a reported cancer risk 
Our study is a specific application to cancer risk message of developments in information 
economics that were informed by health economics and epidemiology. Economic links 
were measured between the informational content of alternative diagnostic tests of the 
gastrointestinal tract, specifically the predictive value of the existing and new diagnostic 
tests, and health expenditures [13]. Doessel’s study draws on concepts on informational 
accuracy already in epidemiology due to Yerushalmy [13, 14], concepts that are now 
standard fare in epidemiology courses [15]. The original concepts imply that there is a 
cross-classification behind determining sensitivity and specificity information about 
diagnostic procedures [14]. Vecchio’s subsequent analysis is a further development [16]. 
Thus, the conceptual and empirical evidence for the economic implications of the 
epidemiological developments exists [13–15].  
The context of these developments is the act of comparing the informational value 
of alternative diagnostic tests and there are clinical and economic implications of that 
information. For a clinician, the dilemma of the information provided by a diagnostic 
test result is to know whether, or not, the patient actually has the disease having been 
tested for, given the test result. The concepts for the clinical situation are as follows. 
There is the positive predictive value (PPV), which is the probability that subjects with a 
positive test truly have the disease, and there is negative predictive value (NPV), which 
is the probability that subjects with a negative test truly do not have the disease. These 
developments arose in the context of diagnostic test information and even though a 
public health message is not a diagnostic test, the relevant economic concepts for cancer 
risk messages are also in these findings. The information conveyed publicly by risk of 
cancer messages is a self-diagnosed personal risk of cancer. The predictive accuracy is 
thus subject to considerable uncertainty.  
For our purposes an individual draws a datum on one’s cancer risk from a reported 
population risk of cancer. For our precise focus, let us focus only on a single specific 
signal being received by an individual from a quoted cancer risk in a public message. We 
extend Doessel’s approach in order to inject economic insights to public health messages. 
To explain, it is necessary to simplify the information that a person can draw from a 
public health message about the risk of cancer.  
Let us assume that two alternative, or dichotomous, conclusions are drawn: either a 
person concludes that “I have a high risk of cancer” or “I have a low risk of cancer”. As 
with the cross-classification approach to diagnostic tests, it will be necessary to bear in 
mind as well that there are two actual states of nature: either the person gets cancer by 
age 85 or the person does not get cancer by age 85.  
Let us next consider the case of an inaccurately reported risk. In any risk information 
conveyed to the public, inaccuracy may be experienced by the individual, from three 
sources at least: the risk reported to the population, the error in the risk information at 
the population level, and the error in the risk information at the individual level. The 
specific focus in the present study is on the first source only, inaccuracy in the quoted 
risk.  
We explicate the specific economic effect of this inaccuracy by an application of 
Doessel’s contingency table (or confusion matrix) [13]. Refer to Table 1. This table 
indicates the implications of inaccuracy in quoting cancer risk: an economic focus has 
the opportunity costs in mind of alternative actions towards cancer prevention, which are 
based on one’s risk information. This table is similar to the confusion matrices used in 
conceiving of the information from diagnostic testing, viz. there are the actual states and 
   
 
 
there is the informational content of a risk message. The cross-classification presented 
in Table 1 as a confusion matrix depicts the four alternative outcomes from the risk of 
cancer message, therein incorporating how to conceive of the “signal error”, and 
alternative allocations of resources are implied. These classes are shown in the column 
and row headings.  There are consequences or outcomes that are four fold: true positive 
(TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN) and false negative (FN). Note that these 
outcomes of the individual information about the risk of cancer derived from the quoted 
population risk are measured in probabilistic terms: the predictive value of a positive 
(high cancer risk) message and the predictive value of a negative (low cancer risk) 
message. 
 
 
Table 1. Outcomes from a risk of cancer message. 
  
Information result of message 
 
 
The people perceiving 
their cancer risk is high 
The people perceiving 
their cancer risk is low 
Row totals 
Actual 
cancer 
states 
The people 
who get cancer 
by age 85 
TP FN 
TP + FN = People who 
get cancer by age 85 
The people 
who do not get 
cancer by age 
85 
FP TN 
FP + TN = People who do 
not get cancer by age 85 
 
Column 
totals 
A high risk message 
being received§  
= TP + FP 
A low risk message  
being received§  
= FN + TN 
Total population at risk 
= TP + FN + FP + TN 
 
Notes:  
TP is true positives, i.e. persons who get cancer by age 85 for whom the risk of cancer message means high cancer risk. 
FN is false negatives, i.e. persons who get cancer by age 85 for whom the risk of cancer message means low cancer risk. 
FP is false positives, i.e. persons who do not get cancer by age 85 for whom the risk of cancer message means high cancer risk. 
TN is true negatives, i.e. persons who do not get cancer by age 85 for whom the risk of cancer message means low cancer risk. 
§ Risk aversion behaviour etc. is placed aside for now. 
 
Despite the conceptual similarities with diagnostic test information, there is not any 
tidy datum about one’s personal cancer risk that is available from a public health message 
with current technology; and thus a person is encouraged to ameliorate genetic and age 
tendencies to cancer onset by responding to a reported risk. Although FN and FP error 
are conceived of conventionally, note that the TP class for a cancer risk message 
incorporates those who, though believing they have high cancer risk and acting 
accordingly to lessen their risk, are yet unsuccessful in any preventive efforts that 
postpone onset; and there are also others whose health actions serve only to exacerbate 
their cancer risk. Also, the TN class is merely a situation of those who do not seek to 
prevent cancer and do not die from cancer – death by age 85 happens nonetheless, from 
another cause. 
   
 
 
2. The two parts of the policy objective for cancer risk information 
Table 1 also indicates the context of rational policy over cancer risk information. It is 
possible to incorporate economic welfare into the decision-making that arises from 
cancer risk information. Rational policy over risk of cancer messages considers the 
opportunity costs of policy alternatives. At first glance, placing a focus solely on the TP 
cell in Table 1 could seem reasonable. A single focus for cancer policy, such as a focus 
of the TP rate, appears to define the bounds of a risk message that informs people 
accurately of their cancer risk. However, a focus just on the TP rate does not avert losses 
to economic welfare from inaccurate information about the risk of cancer message: 
resource misallocation is likely from an inaccurate risk value. The confusion matrix 
implies that an objective that is set to lower the FN rate [which is 𝐹𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃)] from 
cancer risk messages promote both public health and also raise economic welfare. The 
future (actual) cancer state of the population is not known presently; resources are least 
misallocated from economic decisions made by individuals receiving a cancer risk signal 
when the inaccuracy of the message is the lowest possible within a given budget 
constraint.  
Let us express this notion in terms of a message having predictive value, and recall   
 𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁
 (1a) 
and it can be stated also that 
 (1 − 𝑁𝑃𝑉) =
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁
 (1b) 
It follows that the bureaucratic objective function for a cancer policy that incorporates 
policy on messages about the risk of cancer is:  
 𝑀𝑖𝑛. (1 − 𝑁𝑃𝑉) subject to the budget constraint. (2) 
This objective encompasses averting the risk of cancer as well as averting losses to 
economic welfare by a policy focus that incorporates appropriately minimising 
inaccuracy on information on cancer risk.  
For rational public policy, a further public health objective is implied in the objective 
of minimising (1 − 𝑁𝑃𝑉), within a given public health budget. The public health policy 
maker cannot focus on the cancer risk message only, as if there are no other causes of 
death. A two-part policy objective involves lowering not only the accurately reported TP 
rate but also minimising (1-NPV) subject to the budget constraint. The two parts of the 
objective ensure jointly that the policy maker avoids heightening the risk of mortality 
from other causes. This is a possible implication of a cancer risk message that has low 
accuracy that in turn misallocated resources.  
The two parts are mutually exclusive, though inverse, within the existing mortality 
rate. Ignoring some cells in the contingency table is hazardous to economic welfare, 
which can cause flow-on effects to public health anyway. Overall economic efficiency 
can be improved from accurate cancer risk messages by reducing both erroneous false 
positive information and erroneous false negative information.   
   
 
 
3. Conclusions 
We have examined whether, or not, accurate messages about cancer risk can improve not 
only public health, but economic welfare also. This exposition concludes with an 
affirmative response a priori: there are economic implications of cancer risk messages. 
The implications under consideration arise in the private and the public sectors of 
the economy as risk messages involve informational balances affecting economic 
welfare. There is both a false negative rate and a false positive rate to be considered in 
the risk being quoted. Private decisions in response to a reported risk affect economic 
welfare for everyone as private decision-making affects resource allocation overall.  In 
the public sphere, policy makers either under-respond or they can over-respond in any 
policy stance adopted towards public health information reporting the risk of cancer. 
Following Niskanen, it is vital for governments to restrain bureaucrats from budget 
maximisation in public health, ensuring instead that public health budgets pursue social 
efficiency [17]. The argument herein is somewhat unsurprising: the quoted risk of cancer 
obviously is relevant to individual economic responses to cancer risk. However policy 
makers ought to be governed by the appropriate objective/s. More work needs to be done 
but with some initial results, we can demonstrate the appropriate approach to risk of 
cancer estimation. The model can be developed further to answer many useful questions 
with appropriate assumptions.  
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